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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(k). Because this is an interlocutory appeal, 
a certification under Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. is required for appeal. 
In the Default Judgment appealed herein, the trial court 
certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. that the default 
judgment appealed from constituted a final judgment as to all 
claims between the Plaintiffs and A.J. Dean, and that no just 
1 
reason existed to delay appeal,(R2351). The facts underlying 
this appeal are not sufficiently similar to the facts underlying 
the claims remaining before the trial court to constitute res 
judicata on those claims. 
The claims of the Scot, Brenda, and Sheila Roberts against 
Milton Muir, and of Muir against Scot and Brenda Roberts, remain 
pending before the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The core question present in this appeal is whether it was 
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter the default 
of A.J. Dean as a discovery sanction under the circumstances here 
present. A.J. Dean denies that any of the threshold "fault" 
findings required for the imposition of discovery sanctions were 
present. Morton Vt Continental Baking C o w 938 p.2d 271, 1997; 
Wright v. Wright 941 P.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1997) A.J. Dean also 
claims that the trial court abused its discretion because its 
decision to impose the maximum sanction was based on erroneous 
conclusions of law and lacked any evidentiary basis. The 
following specific issues of law and fact are raised in this 
appeal. 
A. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that 
A.J. Dean's failure to make timely answer to medical malpractice 
interrogatories mistakenly served by plaintiffs amount to 
intentional fault justifying the imposition of discovery 
sanctions. This is a mixed question of law and fact. The scope 
of review is abuse of discretion, narrowed in this case to 
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reflect the severity of the sanction imposed. Utah Dep't of 
Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). This issue was 
raised in A.J. Dean's Motion for a Protective Order (R424) and in 
A.J. Dean's Answer to First Set of Interrogatories and Requests 
for Product (R433). 
B. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that 
Plaintiffs' failure to serve all pleadings on Green & Berry after 
March 29, 1994, in particular the proposed form of Order 
containing the April 5, 1994 response deadline, did not establish 
grounds under U.R.C.P. 60(b) for setting aside the default 
entered by the trial Court. This issue is a legal issue to be 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Katz v. Pierce 732 P.2d 92, 
(Utah 1986). This issue was raised in A.J. Dean's Motion to Set 
Aside Entry of Default (R1722), which was denied. (R1969) 
C. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Green 
& Berry's Substitution of Counsel, filed and served March 29, 
1994, did not effectively enter the appearance of the firm as 
counsel for Defendant A.J. Dean for all purposes as of that date. 
This issue is a legal issue to be reviewed for correctness. 
state v. Penar 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman 
846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993). This issue was raised in A.J. 
Dean's Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Discovery (R670), and 
A.J. Dean's Motion for Relief from Order of April 7, 1994 (R783). 
Both motions were disposed of by the order of the Court (R1424, 
R1428) . This issue was also raised in A.J. Dean's Motion to Set 
Aside Entry of Default (R1722), which was denied, (R1969). 
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C. Whether the sanction of default can be imposed on A.J. 
Dean for failing to meet a discovery deadline set forth in a 
written order of court not entered until after the deadline had 
passed. This issue is a legal issue to be reviewed for correct-
ness. State v. Penar 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Thurman 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993). This issue was raised in 
A.J. Dean's Motion to Extend Time to Respond to Discovery (R670), 
and A.J. Dean's Motion for Relief from Order of April 7, 1994 
(R783). Both motions were disposed of by the order of the Court 
(R1424, R1428). This issue was also raised in A.J. Dean's Motion 
to Set Aside Entry of Default (R1722), which was denied. (R1969) 
D. Whether the lower court erred in concluding that a 
thirteen (13) day delay in the receipt of the tardy Discovery 
Responses caused Plaintiffs' prejudice sufficient to support a 
denial of A.J. Dean Rule 60(b) motions, in light of the fact that 
proceedings in the lower Court were delayed for approximately a 
year at Plaintiffs request while they obtained new counsel. This 
issue is a legal issue to be reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 
1256, 1266 (Utah 1993). This issue was raised in A.J. Dean's 
Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default (R1722), which was 
denied.(R1969) 
E. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that A.J. 
Dean would not be allowed to present witnesses and evidence on 
the issues of unliquidated damages, and in denying Defendant A.J. 
Dean a full opportunity to cross-examine Plaintiffs' witnesses, 
4 
at the hearing of August 13, 1996, held for the purpose of 
demonstrating that existence of a prima facie claim and to fix 
unliquidated damages. This issue is a legal issue to be reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Pefiar 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Thurman 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993). This issue was 
raised in A.J. Dean's Motion Requesting Full Participation in 
Further Proceedings on the issue of Damages (R1217), and ruled on 
by the trial court. (Transcript at R1498, Order at R1554). 
F. Whether the trial Court erred at the hearing held 
August 13, 1996 by allowing evidence of a prima facie claim and 
unliquidated damages to be presented by a narrative oral proffer 
of counsel, which was then adopted by the Plaintiffs, while 
denying any opportunity for cross-examination and presentation of 
rebuttal evidence. This issue is a legal issue to be reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Penar 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State 
v. Thurmanr 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993). This issue was 
raised by objection during the damages hearing. (Transcript of 
damages hearing, R2 386, p. 37) 
G. Whether the trial Court erred in awarding punitive 
damages; and whether granting punitive damages on the basis of a 
default judgment constitutes grounds for setting aside the 
default judgment. These are legal issue to be reviewed for cor-
rectness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Thurman 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993). This issue was raised in 
A.J. Dean's Memorandum in Opposition to Award of Damages (R2061). 
H. Whether the trial Court erred in entering the Default 
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of Defendant A.J. Dean upon motion presented by Mr. Rencher, of 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith, at the same time that Hanson, Epperson 
& Smith was representing Defendant A.J. Dean in other litigation. 
This issue is a legal issue to be reviewed for correctness. 
State Vt Pefia, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurmanr 
846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993). The conflict was not discovered 
by A.J. Dean until after its default had been entered and its 
Motion to Set Aside the Default filed. The trial court was made 
aware of the conflict during argument on the Motion to Set Aside 
the Default (Transcript R2383 at p. 19), and in the testimony of 
Mr. Rencher. (Transcript of damages hearing, p. 140) 
GOVERNING LAW 
Provisions of statutes and rules which are of central 
importance to this appeal are set out verbatim in the portion of 
the argument to which they apply. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition Below* 
This case began as a dispute between home owners Scot and 
Brenda Roberts (hereafter Roberts) and their contractor Milton 
Muir over the construction of a new driveway for the Roberts1 
home in November 1992. The Roberts objected to the quality of 
the new driveway installed by Muir, and refused to pay Muir the 
full amount of his invoice. Muir in turn did not pay the A.J. 
Dean invoice in the amount of $1,312.30 for the concrete A.J. 
Dean had supplied for the driveway at Muir's request. A.J. Dean 
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filed a mechanics lien against the property for the invoiced 
amount, plus $200 in costs, on January 19, 1993, (R2040). When 
the case was filed March 29, 1993 A.J. Dean was joined as a 
defendant. R0001. 
However, procedural issues dominated proceedings in the 
trial court after the answer of A.J. Dean was stricken as a 
sanction for being thirteen days late in meeting a court ordered 
discovery deadline.1 The imposition of the default gives rise to 
this appeal. 
Speaking broadly, the central issues on appeal are whether 
the lower court was correct in concluding that A.J. Dean's 
failure to timely answer the medical malpractice interrogatories 
mistakenly served by the Plaintiff constitutes intentional fault 
sufficient to support the sanction of default; whether the trial 
court abused its discretion by employing erroneous conclusions of 
law; and whether the sanction imposed lacked an evidentiary 
basis. 
The procedural history which gives rise to these issues 
includes many unusual factors, including plaintiffs erroneous 
service of form medical malpractice interrogatories, a change of 
counsel at a critical juncture, the accidental or intentional 
failure by plaintiffs to serve important pleadings on counsel of 
record, the purported violation of a deadline contained in a 
1
 Certificate of Service of Discovery R706. The actual 
discovery responses are at R1756-1784. No motion challenging the 
substantive adequacy of these responses was ever filed. 
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court order not entered until after the deadline had elapsed, and 
concurrent representation of the plaintiffs and the defendant by 
the same law firm, at the same time. 
On December 5, 1994 the trial court struck the answer of 
A.J. Dean and entered its default (R1685-1701,1699) as a sanction 
for failing to comply with a court order signed and entered April 
7, 1994 setting a deadline of April 5, 1994 to "answer 
Interrogatory Nos. 2 3 and 2 6 from Roberts1 First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Nos. 2 
and 4 from Roberts1 First Set of Request for Production of 
Documents, and to answer all of Roberts1 second discovery 
requests [a single interrogatory]. R640. 
On April 14, 1994 A.J. Dean filed a motion seeking to extend 
the April 5, 1994 deadline until April 22, 1994. R670. On April 
29, 1994 A.J. Dean filed an initial Rule 60(b) motion seeking 
relief from the April 7, 1994 order. R783. Both motions were 
denied. R1699. A.J. Dean specifically challenges the denial of 
these motions. 
A.J. Dean's motion for full participation in default 
proceedings was filed July 8, 1994 (R1217) and denied on October 
3, 1994. R1570-1581). A.J. Dean challenges this decision. 
On January 13, 1995 A.J. Dean filed a Rule 60(b) motion 
seeking relief from the order of the court entering its default. 
R1722. A.J. Dean challenges denial of that motion by order dated 
February 23, 1996.(R1969). 
A hearing to establish prima facie claims and fix damages 
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was held August 13, 1996. (R2386.) A.J. Dean challenges the 
limitations placed on its participation in that hearing, and the 
presentation of evidence by narrative proffer of Roberts counsel 
rather than by testimony. Default Judgment was entered against 
A.J. Dean on December 20, 1996 (R2359), awarding Roberts 
compensatory damages in the amount of $28,978.01, plus $5,000.00 
in punitive damages. The Notice of Appeal was filed January 6, 
1997. (R2353.) 
B. Statement <?f Facts. 
The record on appeal consists almost entirely of the 
pleadings filed herein. The evidentiary record relevant to the 
entry of A.J. Deanfs default and the appeal taken therefrom 
consists of the Affidavits of Raymond Scott Berry (R1785), Julie 
V. Lund (1794), Randall Marshall (R779, R1790) and Jaryl Rencher 
(R1953), all counsel herein, filed in connection with A.J. Dean's 
challenges to the entry of its default; and in the transcript of 
the hearing held August 13, 1996 to establish claims prima facie, 
and to fix unliquidated and punitive damages. (R22386.) 
MARCH 29, 1993 - MARCH 21, 1994 
1. ihe Complaint initiating this action was filed March 29, 
1993. (R0001.) 
2. (The Answer of Defendant A.J. Dean (a corporation) was 
filed April 29, 1993. (R00096.) 
3. The Roberts served their First Set of Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents requests on A.J. Dean on 
August 18, 1993 ( Certificate of Service, R204). Copies of the 
9 
discovery requests were included as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Compel filed January 21, 
1994. (R396-404; Addendum Ex. A). These were form book 
interrogatories drafted for use by plaintiffs in medical 
malpractice actions. They were drafted using language addressed 
to an individual, rather than a corporation, asked for personal 
information such as marital status, and place of birth, and 
focused on medical history and condition. (R398-404). 
Plaintiff never corrected this error by withdrawing the 
defective interrogatories and serving corrected amended discovery 
pleadings on A.J. Dean. Plaintiffs1 counsel Mr. Rencher 
attempted to amend the defective interrogatories by writing to 
A.J. Dean's counsel Randall Lee Marshall on November 22, 1993, 
asking him to substitute "information relative to this case and 
the property in question" for the references to medical 
malpractice in the discovery pleadings. (R405.) 
4. On January 3, 1994, the Roberts served a Second Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents upon 
A.J. Dean. This discovery request consisted of a single 
interrogatory, asking A.J. Dean to fill out attached forms 
describing the financial condition of A.J. Dean. R409-418. 
5. The Roberts filed a Motion to Compel seeking answers to 
both sets of discovery on January 18, 1994 (R381-382), although 
answers to the second set of discovery were not then due. 
6. On January 31, 1994, A.J. Dean filed its Response to the 
Motion to Compel and For Sanctions and Defendant A.J. Dean's 
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Motion for a Protective Order. (R424.) Included with the response 
were answers to Plaintiff's First Request for Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents. (R424.) The answers are 
attached as an exhibit at R435. 
7. On February 7, 1994, Plaintiffs filed their Reply to 
A.J. Dean Response to Motion to Compel and for Sanctions 
maintaining that the answers received were unsatisfactory because 
they were tardy and not signed by A.J. Dean. (R427.) 
8. The Roberts filed their Notice to Submit in regard to 
their Motion to Compel on February 3, 1994. (R449.) A.J. Dean 
filed its Notice to Submit on A.J. Dean's Motion for a Protective 
Order Regarding Discovery on February 14, 1994. (R457.) 
9. On February 18, 1994, the court issued its Minute Entry 
scheduling hearing on Roberts' Motion to Compel and A.J. Dean's 
Motion for a Protective Order to be heard March 21, 1994. 
10. On March 14, 1994 Plaintiffs filed their Motion for 
Summary Judgment against A.J. Dean and other Defendants (R556; 
Memorandum in support at R521). 
11. A hearing was held on March 21, 1994 to address 
Plaintiffs outstanding Motion to Compel against A.J. Dean and on 
A.J. Dean's Response to Motion to Compel and for Sanctions and 
Defendant A.J. Dean's Motion for a Protective Order. (R424.) 
(Transcript of Proceedings at R2379, Addendum Exhibit B.) 
Randall Lee Marshall appeared as counsel for A.J. Dean. 
Accompanying him was Robert Bagley, the general manager of A.J. 
Dean. 
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12. At the hearing on March 21, 1994 Mr. Rencher, counsel 
for the Plaintiffs conceded that because most of the 
interrogatories at issue in the motion sought medical malpractice 
information, and because he had received some responses, his 
motion to compel would be limited to Interrogatories No. 2 3 
(asking for annual gross income information), No. 2 6 (individuals 
who worked on the concrete job), and Requests for Production No. 
2 and 4, and that A.J. Dean be required to answer the Second Set 
of Interrogatories. (Single question asking that financial 
statement forms be completed)(Transcript of Proceedings at R2379, 
Addendum Exhibit B, p. 17-19.) 
13. The Court decided the motions from the bench. Based on 
Mr. Rencher's withdrawal of the medical malpractice 
interrogatories during the hearing the court directed that A.J. 
Dean answer Interrogatories 23 and 26 from the First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents 
paragraphs 2 and 4, and answer the Second Set of Interrogatories. 
The Court stated that A.J. Dean would have until April 5, 1994 to 
file its response to those interrogatories. (Transcript of 
Proceedings at R2379, p. 19-20.) The Court also indicated it 
would grant reasonable attorney fees as prayed for by Plaintifffs 
upon submission of an Affidavit by Mr. Rencher. The Court asked 
Mr. Rencher to prepare the order. 
MARCH 21, 1994 - JUNE 27, 1994 
14. On March 23, 1994, Randall Lee Marshall, then counsel 
for A.J. Dean, filed a Motion to Amend Admissions (R561), 
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including proposed Amended Answers to Requests for Admissions 
(unsigned R571), supported by an Affidavit signed by Mr. Bagley. 
(R568.) Mr. Marshall also filed on that day a pleading entitled 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment against A.J. Dean, 
(R563) opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by 
Plaintiffs on March 14, 1994. 
15. On March 24, 1994, A.J. Dean dismissed Mr. Marshall as 
its counsel and retained Raymond Scott Berry of Green & Berry as 
its new counsel to replace Mr. Marshall. (Affidavit of Raymond 
Scott Berry, p. 2, para. 2, R1786.) 
16. Mr. Berry instructed attorney Julie Lund, an associate 
in his office, to obtain the case file from Mr. Marshall, file a 
substitution of counsel, and contact Plaintiffs counsel, Mr. 
Rencher, in regard to the status of the case. Ms. Lund carried 
out those instructions. Mr. Rencher was made aware that Green & 
Berry would be representing A.J. Dean no later than March 25, 
1994, when Ms. Lund spoke to Mr. Rencher. (Aff. of Raymond Scott 
Berry, R1786, p. 2, para. 3.) 
17. Julie Lund became involved in this case on Thursday, 
March 24th, 1994 when Scott Berry requested that she obtain the 
pleading file from Randall Marshall, then current counsel for 
A.J. Dean. Mr. Berry told Ms. Lund that A.J. Dean had decided to 
dismiss Mr. Marshall and retain Green & Berry as counsel for A.J. 
Dean. (Affidavit of Julie V. Lund. R1795, p. 2, para. 1.) 
18. Julie V. Lund picked up the file from Mr. Marshall's 
receptionist on March 24, 1994. She reviewed the pleadings 
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contained in the file in her office. She found no pleadings 
referencing the March 21, 1994 hearing. She found no pleading 
referring to an order compelling A.J. Dean to serve discovery 
responses by April 5, 1994 on penalty of default, or awarding 
attorney fees. She noticed that Plaintiffs1 counsel was a 
classmate of hers and she volunteered to Mr. Berry to call Mr. 
Rencher to see if she could determine what Plaintiff's specific 
claims were against A.J. Dean and the status of the case. 
(Affidavit of Julie V. Lund. R1795, p. 2, para. 2.) 
19. She made that call on Friday, March 25, 1994. Mr. 
Rencher was not available. Ms. Lund left a message with his 
office asking that he return the call. (Affidavit of Julie V. 
Lund. R1795, p. 2, para. 3.) 
20. She spoke with Mr. Rencher on Monday, March 28th. She 
told Mr. Rencher that Green & Berry would be appearing in this 
case on behalf of A.J. Dean. She asked Mr. Rencher what claims 
were being made against A.J. Dean. Her notes from this 
conversation indicate that Mr. Rencher informed her of his claims 
against A.J. Dean for damage to the lawn and roof of the Roberts' 
house and that he thought the concrete had too much water in it 
and that explained why it was failing. Mr. Rencher also 
volunteered that there was an expert designation due from 
Plaintiffs later that week and that the court had ordered A.J. 
Dean to designate its experts by April 15th. Mr. Rencher also 
mentioned that there was a discovery cutoff at the end of May. 
(Affidavit of Julie V. Lund. R1795, p. 2, para. 4.) 
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21. During this call Mr. Rencher did not disclose to Ms. 
Lund that there was an outstanding order directing A.J. Dean to 
respond to discovery by April 5, 1994. He did not tell her that 
there was an order pending requiring A.J. Dean to pay attorney 
fees. Mr. Rencher made no objection (during this conversation) 
to Green & Berry appearing on behalf of A.J. Dean. (Affidavit of 
Julie V. Lund. R1796, p. 3, para. 5.) 
22. Mr. Rencher confirmed his conversation of March 28, 
1994, in a letter dated March 29, 1994, (Exhibit F to A.J. Deans 
Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Set Aside Entry of 
Default, R1801.) The only court deadlines described by Mr. 
Rencher during his conversation with Ms. Lund were the expert 
designation date and discovery cut-off. (Affidavit of Julie V. 
Lund. R1796, p. 3, para. 6.) 
23. On March 29, 1994, Ms. Lund filed with the Court and 
served on counsel a pleading styled Substitution of Counsel, 
stating that Green & Berry firm would be appearing as counsel for 
A.J. Dean, substituting for then counsel Randall Marshall. 
(R575.) The Substitution of Counsel did not request any delay in 
the proceedings. Ms. Lund assumed that thereafter Green & Berry 
would be treated as counsel of record for A.J. Dean, and that all 
papers would be served on her firm in conformance with Rule 5. 
(Affidavit of Julie V. Lund. R1796 p.3, para. 7.) On March 30, 
1994, Mr. Randall Marshall filed his Withdrawal of Counsel 
indicating therein that Green & Berry would be appearing as new 
counsel. (R594.) 
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24. On March 31, Mr. Rencher filed an objection to the 
substitution of counsel, on the ground that substitution implied 
a withdrawal by Mr. Marshall within the meaning of Rule 4-506(1) 
of the Code of Judicial Administration and that Mr. Marshall 
could not withdraw without leave of court. (R591.) The objection 
was served both on Mr. Marshall and Green & Berry as attorney for 
A.J. Dean. (R592.) 
25. Although Ms. Lund disagreed with the objection, the 
fact that the pleading was served on Green & Berry led her to 
reasonably believe that Mr. Rencher would continue to serve 
pleadings which he was filing on Green & Berry. (Affidavit of 
Julie V. Lund, R1797 p.4, para. 9.) 
26. On April 5, 1994, Green & Berry served written 
discovery on Plaintiffs. (R595.) On April 10, 1994, Green & 
Berry received a letter from Mr. Rencher dated April 6, 1994, 
addressed as well to Mr. Marshall. The letter asked for 
cooperation in setting the depositions of A.J. Dean personnel. 
(R1801.) (Affidavit of Julie V. Lund, R1797 p.4, para. 10-11.) 
27. On April 12, 1994 Green & Berry received a letter from 
Mr. Rencher dated April 7, 1994, addressed both to Green & Berry 
and Mr. Marshall confirming that Mr. Rencher had received A.J. 
Dean's discovery, but alleging some confusion regarding who was 
counsel of record for A.J. Dean. (Affidavit of Julie V. Lund, 
R1797 p.4, para. 12.) 
28. On April 12, 1994 Julie V. Lund spoke on the telephone 
to Mr. Rencher. During this phone call he told her that an Order 
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had been signed awarding Plaintiffs attorney fees as a sanction 
for failure to respond to discovery. Mr. Rencher also told her 
that an Order had been signed directing A.J. Dean to serve 
certain discovery responses on Plaintiff by April 5, 1994. 
Despite her previous communications with Mr. Rencher, and the 
written communication described above, this was the first 
occasion on which she learned of the April 5, 1994 discovery 
deadline. (Affidavit of Julie V. Lund, R1797 p.4, para. 13.) 
29. On April 13, 1994 Mr. Rencher faxed to Julie Lund a 
copy of the Order of April 7, 1994. On April 14, 1994, Julie Lund 
examined the court's file and learned for the first time that an 
Order had indeed been signed on April 7, 1994, directing A.J. 
Dean to make certain discovery responses by April 5, 1994. As a 
result of the fax transmittal from Mr. Rencher on April 13, and 
Ms. Lund's review of the court file on April 14 she realized that 
Mr. Rencher had been serving some pleadings on Green & Berry, but 
not others. (Affidavit of Julie V. Lund, R1798 p.5, para. 14.) 
30. After discovering this information, on April 14, 1994 
Green & Berry filed an Objection to the pleadings filed with the 
court by Mr. Rencher between March 28, 1994 and April 14, 1994 
which had not been served on Green & Berry; filed a Motion to 
extend the April 5, 1994 deadline until April 22, 1994; and filed 
a Rule 60 (b) motion for relief from the Order of April 7, on the 
ground of excusable neglect or other good cause. Between March 
28 and April 4, 1994 Ms. Lund believed that Mr. Rencher was 
serving all papers being filed in the action on this firm. Her 
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belief was based on the fact that Mr. Rencher had in fact served 
some pleadings on Green & Berry, and was regularly including this 
office in correspondence sent out during this period. (Affidavit 
of Julie V. Lund, R1798 p.5, para. 15.) 
31. On April 18, 1994, full and complete responses to the 
discovery which the Court had ordered answered were served on Mr. 
Rencher. (Affidavit of Julie V. Lund, R1798 p.5, para. 16.) 
32. From March 29, 1994, the date on which Green & Berry 
filed and served its Substitution of Counsel, Raymond Scott Berry 
believed that Green & Berry was counsel of record for A.J. Dean, 
and was entitled to service of all the pleadings filed herein. 
(Affidavit of Raymond Scott Berry R1786, p. 2 para. 4.) 
33. Based on the filings made by Green & Berry, Green & 
Berry's receipt of what appeared to be all the pleadings filed by 
the Plaintiff, and Ms. Lund's personal contacts with Mr. 
Rencher, Raymond Scott Berry believed that all pleadings being 
filed by the Plaintiffs were being served on Green & Berry. 
(Affidavit of Raymond Scott Berry R1786, p. 2 para. 5.) 
34. On March 31, 1994 Mr. Rencher filed and served by mail 
a pleading entitled Objection to Substitution of Counsel. As of 
the receipt of this pleading by Green & Berry office, Mr. Berry 
knew that Mr. Rencher had some objection to substitution of 
counsel, but assumed that despite Mr. Rencher's objection he was 
serving all pleadings on this office. (Affidavit of Raymond 
Scott Berry R1787, p. 3 para. 6.) 
35. Mr. Berry subsequently learned his assumption was in 
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error. On March 30, 1994, Mr. Rencher had filed and served his 
proposed form of Order relating to the hearing held March 21, 
1994. (R639; mailing certificate R641.) This proposed pleading 
described for the first time in writing the critical April 5, 
1994 deadline (delivered from the bench at the hearing on March 
21,1994) for A.J. Dean's response to certain enumerated 
interrogatories. Mr. Rencher served this pleading only on Mr. 
Marshall, and not on Green & Berry. (R641.) Mr. Berry's 
assumption that he was receiving all the pleadings was 
strengthened by receipt of Roberts' pleading entitled Designation 
of Expert Witness, served on Green & Berry firm on March 30, 
1994, the same day that Mr. Rencher served the proposed Order 
only upon Mr. Marshall. (R578; mailing certificate R579. 
Affidavit of Raymond Scott Berry R1787, p. 3 para. 7.) 
36. Mr. Berry did not learn of the contents of the Order of 
April 7, 1994, including the April 5 deadline set forth therein, 
until Julie Lund told him on April 12th that she had spoken that 
same day to Mr. Rencher, who mentioned that a deadline had 
elapsed. Mr. Rencher faxed this office a copy of the Order of 
April 7th on April 13, 1994 and Mr. Berry and Ms. Lund confirmed 
that the Order had been entered by actually reviewing the court 
file on April 14, 1994. (Affidavit of Raymond Scott Berry R1787, 
p. 3 para. 8.) 
37. Mr. Berry immediately responded to the contents of the 
Order of April 7, 1994 by taking the following actions. On April 
14, 1994 the $501.50 sanction imposed by the Court was paid, with 
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notice of that payment filed of record. (R674.) On April 14, 
1994 Green & Berry filed a motion seeking to extend the April 5, 
1994 deadline until April 22, 1994, on the grounds that Green & 
Berry was unaware of the April 5, 1994 deadline. (R670.) On April 
18, 1994 full and complete responses and answers to the 
interrogatories specifically enumerated in the Order of April 7, 
1994 were served on Plaintiffs1 counsel. (Certificate of Service 
R706; Copies of Responses at R1756-1784. Affidavit of Raymond 
Scott Berry R1787-88, p. 3-4 para. 8-9.) 
38. On April 29, 1994 Green & Berry filed a Rule 60(b) 
Motion for Relief from the Order of April 7, 1994. (R783. 
Supporting Memorandum at R786.) 
39. On April 14, 1994 Mr. Rencher filed a motion asking 
that A.J. Dean's pleadings be stricken and that its default be 
entered. (R688.) A hearing was held on this motion and other 
pending motions on June 27, 1994. (Minute Entry R1212; Transcript 
R2380) Plaintifffs motion to strike pleadings and enter the 
default of A.J. Dean was granted, and all motions of A.J. Dean 
seeking relief from the consequences of failing to meet the April 
5, 1994 discovery deadline were denied. (Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, December 5, 1994; R1685. Transcript 
R2380.) In addition a partial judgment was entered against A.J. 
Dean as liquidated damages in the amount of $9,458.00. (R1702.) 
JUNE 27, 1994 - AUGUST 13, 1996 
40. On January 9, 1995, A. J. Dean filed a Rule 60(b) 
Motion to Set aside the Entry of Default, (Motion at R1722, 
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Supporting Memorandum R1725-1883.) Plaintiffs1 Opposing 
Memorandum was filed approximately nine months later on October 
3, 1995. (R1936.) The intervening delay was caused by 
Plaintiff's search for new counsel, after A.J. Dean had 
independently discovered in January, 1995 that Mr. Rencher's law 
firm, Hanson, Epperson & Smith P.C. has been simultaneously 
representing A.J. Dean in insurance defense litigation since the 
summer of 1994. (See record entries at R1891, R1899, Transcript 
of Proceedings January 12, 1996, R283, p. 4.; Transcript of 
Proceedings August 13, 1996, R2386, p. 140.) 
41. A.J. Dean's Motion to Set Aside the Default was denied. 
(Transcript of Proceedings January 12, 1996, R283; Order R1969.) 
42. A hearing to establish prima facie claims, to fix 
unliquidated damages, and to decide the issue of punitive damages 
was held August 13, 1996. (Transcript of Proceedings, R2386.) 
In advance of the hearing A.J. Dean filed a Written Proffer of 
Evidence (R1976) and a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Award 
of Damages. (R2061). At the hearing, over his objections, 
counsel for A.J. Dean was not allowed to present witnesses or 
introduce evidence, through direct examination or cross 
examination. Plaintiffs presented prima facie evidence of their 
claims through proffer of Plaintiff's counsel, over objections of 
counsel for A.J. Dean. (Transcript, R2386, p.37, 42, 47, 51, 53, 
85.) Participation of counsel for A.J. Dean was limited to cross-
examination of Plaintiffs on their testimony concerning 
unliquidated damages, further constrained to prohibit questions 
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that could be construed as relating to liability or causation. 
43. Default Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs and 
against A.J. Dean on December 20, 1996, awarding Plaintiffs 
damages in the amount of $28,978.01, and punitive damages in the 
amount of $5,000.00. (R2351.) Notice of Appeal was filed January 
6, 1997. (R2353.) No cross appeal was taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A.J. Dean argues that the lower court erred in concluding 
that it was guilty of fault in failing to answer the Roberts 
unamended and erroneous medical malpractice interrogatories. That 
conclusion is the basis for the court's order of April 7, 
granting the Roberts Motion to Compel. The company also argues 
that the court1s subsequent decision to enter the default of A.J. 
Dean for violating the order of April 7, is grounded in erroneous 
conclusions of law, and lacks any evidentiary support. The lower 
court misapplied the provisions of U.R.C.P. 5(a), regarding the 
obligation to serve all pleadings on counsel of record and Rule 
4-506 of the Code of Jud. Admin., regarding substitution of 
counsel; denied A.J. Dean the opportunity to defend on damages 
issues; and ignored the application of Rule 1.7 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
ARgVMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT A, J. DEAN WAS 
AT FAULT FOR FAILING TO MEET THE APRIL 5. 1994 
DISCOVERY DEADLINE 
The trial court decided to impose the maximum sanction of 
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default judgment upon A.J.Dean based on its conclusion that A.J. 
Dean had wilfully frustrated the discovery process. That 
conclusion was mistaken because it was based on erroneous 
conclusions of law and a misunderstanding of the procedural 
record. Establishing that this decision was error entails a 
detailed review of the discovery process. At the outset, it is 
useful to keep in mind the purpose of modern discovery; 
The purposes of discovery rules are to make 
discovery as simple and efficient as possible by 
eliminating any unnecessary technicalities, and to 
remove elements of surprise or trickery so that the 
parties and the court can determine the facts and 
resolve the issues as directly, fairly and 
expeditiously as possible. 
Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967). 
A. By serving the "wrong" discovery on A.J. 
Dean Plaintiffs initiated the confusion and 
misunderstanding which subsequently 
characterized the entire discovery process. 
On August 18, 1993 Plaintiffs served their First Set of 
Interrogatories and Reguests for Production on A.J. Dean. (R393-
404). However, due to an error on the part of Roberts' counsel, 
medical malpractice form interrogatories were served which had 
virtually nothing to do with the Roberts1 contract and warranty 
claims against A.J. Dean. The Roberts never formally withdrew the 
defective interrogatories, and did not fully disclose to the 
trial court the scope of the mistake until the actual March 21, 
1994 hearing held on their Motion to Compel.2 (Transcript, March 
2
 Plaintiffs counsel characterized the mistake as a 
"typographical error M, without explanation, in the Motion to 
Compel which gave rise to the sanction imposed. R385. 
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21, 1994, R2379, p. 8-9.) 
The Roberts were aware of the mistake. In correspondence to 
A.J. Dean counsel (Randall Marshall) dated November 22, 1993. 
(R405), and again on December 9, 1993, Roberts counsel (Jaryl 
Rencher) characterized the mistake as a "typographical error" and 
requested that Marshall cure the defect by simply substituting 
the phrase "information relative to this case and the property in 
question" for the references to medical malpractice in the 
interrogatories. 
The ambiguity inserted into the discovery process at the 
outset by the Roberts use of the wrong form interrogatories, 
compounded by the vague suggestions for a cure described in Mr. 
Rencher's correspondence, created uncertainty in the mind of Mr. 
Marshall regarding the scope of the response required. As a 
result of that continuing uncertainty, Mr. Marshall documented 
A.J. Dean objections to the interrogatories on or about January 
10, 1994, in conjunction with an objection to Plaintiff's Second 
Set of Interrogatories. (R419). 
The target that A.J. Dean's discovery response was required 
to hit kept moving. It was not until the hearing held on March 
21, 1994 that Mr. Rencher agreed, in a discussion involving both 
the court and Mr. Marshall, that A.J. Dean need not respond to 
the medical malpractice interrogatories, volunteering that 
A.J.Dean need respond to only two of the twenty-eight 
interrogatories. (Transcript, March 21, 1994, R2379, p.17-18). 
Seven months after the defective discovery was initially 
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served, A.J. Dean finally knew which questions actually required 
a response. 
There is no procedure described in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure addressing the situation created when the Roberts 
served the "wrong" discovery pleadings on A.J. Dean. The Roberts 
chose not to remedy the error by formally withdrawing the 
defective discovery, and serving corrected amended 
interrogatories, so as to ensure that A.J. Dean would have a fair 
chance to understand what questions it would be required to 
answer. 
The confusion created by the Roberts' medical malpractice 
interrogatories was not resolved for A.J. Dean until the hearing 
held March 21, 1994 on the Roberts1 Motion to Compel Answers to 
those Interrogatories. Despite the fact that Roberts' counsel at 
the hearing voluntarily withdrew all but two of the twenty-eight 
interrogatories, the court still granted the Motion to Compel, 
and imposed a sanction, by requiring A.J. Dean to pay attorney 
fees. 
Although this hearing was the first time that A.J. Dean 
actually knew which questions it was supposed to answer, it was 
not allowed the thirty days to answer provided by U.R.C.P. 33(a). 
The court apparently reasoned that because A.J. Dean had not 
filed timely answers to the nonsensical medical malpractice 
interrogatories (voluntarily waived at the March 21 hearing), it 
was still appropriate that the company be compelled to answer two 
interrogatories included in the defective set (Nos. 23 and 26) 
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within 10 days upon penalty of default. 
The March 21, 1994 hearing, in which the court granted the 
Roberts1 Motion to Compel and directed a response to two 
interrogatories, is the "crux" event in the procedural history of 
the case. The result of that hearing was expressed in the Order 
of court entered April 7, 1994. It was A.J. Dean's failure to 
comply with the April 5th deadline included in the order that was 
the basis for the entry of the A.J. Dean default.3 
B. The Order to Compel dated April 7, 1994 
lacked both legal and factual foundation. 
U.R.C.P. 37(a)(2) allows the issuance of an order to compel 
when a "party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under 
Rule 33". At the March 21, 1994 hearing on Plaintiffs1 Motion to 
Compel, Mr. Rencher conceded that A.J. Dean should not be 
required to answer the medical malpractice interrogatories. 
Therefore, the failure to answer those interrogatories cannot be 
the basis for granting the Motion to Compel. 
The lower court was legally bound to weigh the "fault" of 
the Plaintiffs, in serving and refusing to withdraw the wrong set 
of form interrogatories, against the "fault" of A.J. Dean in 
failing to make timely response to Plaintiffs' nonsensical 
discovery. 
3
 The default of A.J. Dean was entered for failing to meet 
an April 5, 1994 deadline contained in an order entered April 7, 
1994. 
26 
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle 
the business of the court with efficiency and 
expedition the trial court should have a reasonable 
latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure to 
prosecute if a party fails to move forward according to 
the rules and the directions of the court, without 
justifiable excuse. But that prerogative falls short 
of unreasonable and arbitrary action which will result 
in injustice. Whether there is such justifiable excuse 
is to be determined by considering more factors than 
merely the length of time since the suit was filed. 
Some consideration should be given to the conduct of 
both parties, and to the opportunity each has had to 
move the case forward and what they have done about it 
; and also what difficulty or prejudice may have been 
caused to the other side; and most important, whether 
injustice may result from the dismissal, (footnotes 
omitted; emphasis added) 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v, Larsen, 544 
P.2d 876 (1975) 
The lower court failed to give any consideration to the fact 
that interrogatories which the Plaintiffs had served were 
nonsense in the context of the case at bar. The method chosen by 
the Plaintiffs to cure the confusion they created (letter to 
opposing counsel suggesting interlineation of a generic cure, 
without reference to specific language to be replaced) is not 
recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Because March 21, 1994 was the first time that Mr. Rencher 
amended the erroneous discovery, by withdrawing the medical 
malpractice questions in response to A.J. Dean's Objections, the 
company was entitled to the thirty days provided by the rules in 
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which to answer the two questions that purportedly made sense.4 
It was therefore a violation of Rule 33(a) for the court to order 
that they be answered in 10 days upon penalty of default. 
Applying a comparative fault metaphor, if fault must be 
assigned, the majority of the fault lies with the Roberts; for 
serving nonsense discovery, and for failing to formally withdraw 
it and serve corrected pleadings when the error was discovered. 
These mistakes were the proximate cause of A.J. Dean's tardiness. 
The proposition relied on by the lower court, that the fault 
of A.J. Dean lay in not answering an admittedly defective and 
nonsensical set of form interrogatories, when twenty-six out of 
the twenty eight questions were voluntarily withdrawn at the 
hearing on the Motion to Compel, fails the test of both common 
sense and law. 
It cannot be "just" to direct the default of the A.J. Dean 
largely because it failed to answer medical malpractice 
interrogatories withdrawn by the Roberts. Sanctions granted 
under Rule 37(a)(2) are required to be just. 
POINT II 
ROBERTS FAILED TO SERVE THE ORDER TO COMPEL DATED APRIL 
7. CONTAINING THE APRIL 5 DEADLINE. ON A,J, DEAN'S NEW 
COUNSEL OF RECORD. 
Procedurally speaking, events occurring between the March 
21, 1994 hearing on the Roberts' Motion to Compel and the entry 
of the Order to Compel on April 7, 1994 complicated matters still 
4
 Answers were actually filed April 18, 1994. (R706) These 
answers were never challenged by a Motion to Compel. 
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further, to the prejudice of A.J. Dean. These further 
complications arose from the substitution of Green & Berry as 
counsel for A.J. Dean on March 29, 1994, replacing Randall 
Marshall, and Roberts1 failure to serve critical pleadings, 
including the proposed form of the Order to Compel, on new 
counsel of record. 
A. Roberts failed to serve the proposed form 
of Order containing the decisions made at the 
March 21, 1994 hearing on A.J. Dean's counsel 
of record in violation of U.R.C.P. 5(a), 
thereby denying counsel of record knowledge 
of the approaching deadline. 
Following the March 21, 1994 hearing, A.J. Dean dismissed 
its counsel, Randall Marshall, and retained Green & Berry. 
(Affidavit of Raymond Scott Berry, p. 2, para. 2, R1786.) Julie 
V. Lund, an associate at Green & Berry spoke to Mr. Rencher on 
March 28, 1994 notifying him of the change of counsel. (Affidavit 
of Julie V. Lund. R1795, p. 2, para. 4.) Green & Berry filed and 
served a pleading captioned Substitution of Counsel on March 29, 
1994. (R575). 
At the conclusion of the hearing held March 21, 1994, the 
court had directed Mr. Rencher to prepare and submit a proposed 
form of order, including an affidavit in support of the fees 
awarded as sanctions. Mr. Rencher did so under a cover letter 
dated March 30, 1994. (R634). However, the cover letter and the 
proposed form of order both indicate that they were served on Mr. 
Marshall, but not on Green an Berry, which had replaced Mr. 
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Marshall as counsel on March 29, 1994.5 
As a result, Green & Berry remained unaware of the April 5th 
deadline for discovery response included in the Order. By April 
13, 1994, when Green & Berry first learned of the April 5th 
discovery deadline contained in the April 7, 1994 order, the 
response deadline had passed. The failure to meet this deadline 
triggered the default sanction. 
Beginning on April 14, 1994 Green & Berry aggressively 
sought to obtain relief from the Order of April 7th, arguing the 
Roberts had been obligated by U.R.C.P. 5(a) to serve the proposed 
form of order on Green & Berry, thereby apprising new counsel of 
the approaching deadline; and that the Roberts1 failure to do so 
had kept A.J. Dean's counsel ignorant of the April 5th deadline. 
Green & Berryfs concern was increased by the fact that on March 
30, 1994 Roberts' counsel had served some pleadings on Green & 
Berry, but not the critical proposed form of order, thus leaving 
the firm with the erroneous impression that it was receiving all 
of the Roberts' pleadings. (Statement of Facts, para. 3 5fsupra.) 
However, the lower court concluded each time the issue was 
raised that service on Green & Berry, as counsel of record 
beginning March 29, 1994, was not required. In the court's view, 
service on Marshall alone satisfied the service obligation, and 
it was therefore irrelevant that critical pleadings were not 
5
 A step by step description of the events concerning the 
substitution of counsel and Roberts failure to serve critical 
pleadings on new counsel is set forth in the statement of facts 
(supra) para. 14 thru 39. 
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served on Green & Berry. 
The rationale of the Court for adopting this legal 
conclusion was that Marshall remained counsel of record for A.J. 
Dean, because Marshall had not obtained leave of court to 
withdraw pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-506 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration, Withdrawal of Counsel in Civil Cases. 
This conclusion of law was in error. 
B. Leave of Court to withdraw is not 
required when one lawyer substitutes for 
another without asking for a delay in 
proceedings. 
Rule 4-506 states in relevant part; 
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Withdrawal requiring court approval. 
Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an 
attorney may withdraw as counsel of record only upon 
approval of the court when a motion has been filed and 
the court has not issued an order on the motion or 
after a certificate of readiness for trial has been 
filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may not 
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court.... 
(5) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may 
replace the current counsel of record by filing and 
serving a notice of substitution of counsel. Filing a 
substitution of counsel enters the appearance of new 
counsel of record and effectuates the withdrawal of the 
attorney being replaced. Where a request for a delay of 
proceedings is not made, substitution of counsel does 
not require the approval of the court. Where new 
counsel requests a delay of proceedings, substitution 
of counsel requires the approval of the court as 
provided in this rule. (Emphasis added) 
History: Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 
15, 1991; May 15, 1994; November 1, 1997.6 
6
 Subsection (5) was added to the rule by the amendment 
effective November 1, 1997. 
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Green & Berry followed the procedure described in Rule 4-506 
to the letter. (Substitution of Counsel, R575, March 29, 1994). 
The firm was counsel of record as of March 29, 1994, and was 
entitled to service of all pleadings served thereafter, including 
the proposed form of order, served March 30, 1994. By action of 
the Substitution of Counsel, Mr. Marshall's withdrawal was 
effective March 29, 1994. Service of pleadings thereafter on Mr. 
Marshall would not satisfy Rule 5(a) service obligation. 
Under current rules of procedure, the legal conclusion of 
the trial court relied upon by the trial court to justify the 
imposition of default judgment is patently in error. 
C. The current version of Rule 4-506 is controlling. 
Changes in the rules of civil procedure and court 
administration apply retroactively where the change affects only 
procedure and does not destroy vested or contractual rights. 
Retroactive application is prohibited when a statute enlarges or 
destroys vested or contractual rights. Board of Equalization v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n 864 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1993); Rpark yf 
Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058, (Utah 1995). 
The Roberts have no vested or contractual right in the 
procedure to be used when lawyers withdraw from civil actions. 
They have no vested or contractual right to a default judgment, 
grounded in an interpretation of a procedural rule in conflict 
with current law. 
Indeed, constitutional due process rights may be violated if 
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a court refuses to hear the merits of the case where there has 
been a relatively trivial infraction of procedural rules. 
Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co.. 987 F.2d 1536, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 
1993). 
Dismissal is "the most extreme sanction provided 
for in the rule, and the Supreme Court has emphasized 
the necessity for cautious use of the rule . • . • It 
should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances." 
In re Liquid Carbonic Truck Drivers, 580 F.2d 819, 822 
(5th Cir. 1978); see also Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Richards & Assocs., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989); 
Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.P 677 F.2d 339, 
342 (3d Cir. 1982); Wilson. 561 F.2d at 504; Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice § 2284, at 623. 
Morton v. Continental Baking Company, 938 P.2d 271, 
(1977)(Dissent, J. Stewart at 280) 
In the context of this appeal, the service rules obligated 
the Roberts serve all pleadings, including the critical proposed 
form of order on Green & Berry. Green & Berry was entitled to 
receive the proposed form of Order. With knowledge of the 
deadline, Green & Berry would have filed timely responses, and 
avoided the imposition of the default judgment. 
The standard of review which applies in this case is 
described in Morton Vt Continental Baking CQ t / 938 p.2d 
271,(1997) and Wright Vt Wright 941 P.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Both opinions make the point that the all of the relevant 
pleadings were properly served, as one of the factors to 
considered in reviewing the imposition of default as a discovery 
sanction. The Roberts plainly did not properly serve all the 
relevant pleadings on A.J. Dean. 
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POINT III 
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DAMAGES HEARING WAS HELD WAS 
LEGALLY IMPROPER 
All efforts of A.J. Dean to obtain relief from the entry of 
default were unsuccessful. In anticipation of an evidentiary 
hearing to establish prima facie proof of their claims7 and fix 
unliquidated damages, A.J. Dean moved the lower court for the 
opportunity to participate fully in the damages hearing. (R1217; 
Supporting Memorandum at R122 0). A.J. Dean argued that Roberts 
were obligated to prove prima facie claims and unliquidated 
damages by competent evidence; and that A.J. Dean was entitled to 
participate in the determination by presenting evidence by 
counter-affidavit or testimony, and that the court had a 
continuing independent duty, under U.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)8 to 
establish the truth of the Roberts averments by competent 
evidence. Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co.r Ltd.r 701 P.2d 
1106,1113 (1985); McKean v. Mountain View Mem. Estates, Inc., 411 
P.2d 129,131 (1966) 
A.J. Deanfs Motion for Full Participation was denied. 
(Transcript, Aug. 23 & 26, R2381, pp. 32-40.) A.J. Dean's 
7
 Roberts Second Amended included seventeen causes of 
action, R1232-1262. 
8
 U.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). By the court. In all other cases the 
party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court 
therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment to 
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or 
determine the amount of damages or establish the truth of any 
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other 
matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such 
references as it deems necessary and proper. 
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participation was reduced to being present through counsel in the 
courtroom, and to limited cross-examination of Roberts1 
unliquidated damages witnesses. A.J. Dean was not allowed to 
present its own witnesses on unliquidated damages, or introduce 
documentary evidence on cross-examination. 
The hearing was held August 13, 1996.9 Over A.J. Dean's 
objection, the court allowed the evidence of establish prima 
facie claims to be presented by narrative proffer by Roberts1 
counsel rather than by direct testimony. (Transcript, August 13, 
1996, R2386, p. 37-39, 42.) 
As a matter of law, A.J. Dean was entitled to full rights of 
defense at the damages hearing; 
The amount of damages requested here was neither a 
sum certain nor a sum readily calculable, and the court 
did not take evidence as to the reasonableness of the 
amount. The amount of the damages, $4,946 plus $183 per 
month until the child reaches age nineteen, is sizable. 
We therefore remand for an evidentiary hearing on 
damages, at which hearing the defendant is entitled to 
appear and defend with counsel. (Emphasis added) 
Larsen v. Colina 684 P.2d 52,56 (Utah 1984) 
Narrative proffers of evidence by counsel, over objection, 
are inherently unreliable specifically because they are not 
constrained by cross-examination. Counsel for Roberts knew that 
his proffered evidence would not be subject to cross examination. 
When counsel for A.J. Dean objected on the grounds that the 
9
 Prior to the hearing, A.J. Dean made a written proffer of 
the damage evidence that it would have presented, if it had been 
allowed to present evidence. R1976. The proffer was stricken. 
(Transcript, Judges Ruling, August 13, 1996, R2384, p. 3) 
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proffer being made by Roberts' counsel would directly contradict 
the Roberts own deposition testimony, the court over-ruled the 
objection, based on the reasonable anticipation that the Roberts 
would adopt the statements made by their counsel, regardless of 
what they may have said in the past. (Transcript, Aug. 13 1996, 
R2386, pp. 52-53.) 
Prima facie proof is still a measure of proof. Proof is the 
body of competent evidence remaining after testimony has been 
measured and tested by other evidence and by the process of 
cross-examination. A non-defaulting party remains obligated to 
prove recoverable damages and costs by competent evidence. Amica 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950,963 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Because the lower court prohibited A.J. Dean from presenting 
any contrary evidence, the hearing as conducted served simply to 
"rubber stamp" the Roberts1 claims, rather than as an objective 
analysis designed to determine whether the prima facie standard 
of proof had been met. The error was compounded by allowing the 
narrative statements of Roberts1 counsel, as "blessed" by the 
Roberts themselves, to substitute for competent evidence of 
unliquidated damages. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS 
PART OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT10 
10
 The trial court awarded Robert punitive damages in the 
amount of five thousand dollars without describing any fact 
findings in support of the award. (R2340). 
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Prior to the damages hearing held August 13, 1996, A.J. 
Dean filed written argument opposing any award of punitive 
damages, on the ground that punitive damages can only be awarded 
on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, establishing 
wilful, malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct 
manifesting a knowing and reckless indifference to the rights of 
others. §78-18-1 et. seq. U.C.A. (R2070.) The clear and 
convincing standard is not met where the claimant is awarded 
punitive damages based on the prima facie showing created when 
the alleged tortfeasor is not allowed the opportunity to cross-
examine and present counter evidence. 
The approved procedure in Utah for fixing damages, 
including punitive damages, in the default context allows for the 
participation of the defaulting party. In both Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950,963 (Ct. App. 1989) and 
Synergetics v, Marathon Ranching Co.. 701 P.2d 1106,1113 (Utah 
1985) the defaulting party was allowed to submit counter-
affidavits contesting punitive damage evidence. 
In this action, A.J. Dean submitted an extensive written 
proffer of evidence prior to the damages hearing. (R1976.) 
Roberts1 Motion to Strike the Proffer on the grounds that a 
defaulting party was not allowed to submit damage evidence was 
granted and the proffer stricken. (Judge's Ruling, Transcript, 
R2384 p. 3.) Thus, in addition to being denied an opportunity to 
present damage evidence and cross examine witnesses at the damage 
hearing, the written evidence proffered by A.J. Dean was not 
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considered. Both actions are contrary to Utah law. 
POINT V 
THE ENTRY OF DEFAULT MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE LAW 
FIRM REPRESENTING THE ROBERTS WHEN THE DEFAULT WAS 
OBTAINED WAS CONCURRENTLY REPRESENTING A, J, DEAN, 
This action contains many unusual elements. One of the most 
striking is that Hanson, Epperson & Smith, which represented the 
Roberts, was also concurrently representing A.J. Dean in other 
litigation. (Transcript, Hearing on Damages Issue, August 13, 
1996, R2386, p. 140, 165-166, testimony of Jaryl Rencher.) 
Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states 
1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule. 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if 
the representation of that client will be directly 
adverse to another client, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not adversely affect the 
relationship with the other client; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited 
by the lawyer1s responsibilities to another client or 
to a third person or by the lawyer's own interest, 
unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. When 
representation of multiple clients in a single matter 
is undertaken, the consultation shall include 
explanation to each client of the implications of the 
common representation and the advantages and risks 
involved. 
(c) A lawyer shall not simultaneously represent 
the interests of adverse parties in separate matters, 
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unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation of each will not be adversely affected; 
and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. 
Mr. Rencher testified that his firm began its representation 
of A.J. Dean in insurance defense matters in July 1994, before 
the entry of the order entering the default of A.J. Dean. At all 
times, the interests of the Roberts and A.J. Dean were directly 
adverse. They were in fact adverse parties. 
At no time did any member of the law firm notify or consult 
A.J. Dean regarding the direct conflict of interest, and at no 
time did the firm obtain the consent of A.J. Dean to 
simultaneously represent directly adverse parties with direct and 
extremely adverse interests. The conflict was discovered by A.J. 
Dean only in January, 1995, after the filing of its Rule 60(b) 
motion for relief from the entry of default. A.J. Dean was denied 
the opportunity to bring the conflict to the attention of the 
court prior to the entry of default because the law firm failed 
to meet its obligation to disclose the conflict and obtain 
consent. 
The burden of making full disclosure rests on the law firm 
undertaking adverse employment. In Re HansenP 586 P.2d 413, 415 
(1978) . For client consent to be adequate in a conflict of 
interest situation, the lawyer must not only inform both parties 
that he is undertaking to represent them, but must also explain 
the nature and implications of the conflict in enough detail so 
that the parties can understand why independent counsel may be 
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desirable. In re Bovin. 533 P.2d 171, 174 (Oregon 1975). 
The legal issue is what consequences result from the plain 
violation of the ethical rule in the legal context present here? 
This is a question of first impression in Utah. 
In Maraulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195,1204 (Utah 1985), 
applying Cannon 9 (Utah Code of Professional Responsibility 
1977) , the Utah Supreme Court accurately noted; 
"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of 
professional impropriety." The basis of this tenet is 
that society's perception of the integrity of our legal 
system may be as important as the reality, since it is 
the perception that engenders public confidence that 
justice will be dispensed. Litigants are highly 
unlikely to be able to maintain this confidence if 
their attorney in one matter is allowed simultaneously 
to sue them in another, (emphasis added) 
The plain conflict committed by the Roberts' attorneys has 
irreversibly tainted proceedings in the lower court. The lawyers 
suing A.J. Dean in one action simultaneously represented the 
company in two other actions. In Marguliesf (supra at 12 05) the 
Supreme Court held, largely on public policy grounds, that a law 
firm which had formerly represented adverse parties could not be 
allowed to continue to represent plaintiffs in a personal injury 
action, even though the delay in finding new counsel was 
prejudicial to the plaintiff's position. 
By itself, the violation of the ethical rule would provide 
adequate support for reversal of the lower court by setting aside 
the default judgment. That conclusion is only strengthened when 
the ethical violation is considered along with the other unusual 
elements present in this case; the "wrong" form interrogatories, 
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the failure to serve critical pleadings on opposing counsel, and 
simultaneous mailing certificates issuing from the same office on 
different pleadings, designating different opposing counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The scope of appellate review which applies in challenges to 
defaults entered as discovery sanctions, established by the 
recent decision in Morton v. Continental Baking Co.f 938 P.2d 
271,( Utah 1997) and Wright v. Wright 941 P.2d 646 (Ct. App. 
1997) are applicable here. To be successful, the challenge must 
demonstrate that the threshold finding of fault made by the trial 
court lacks evidentiary support, or that the trial court abused 
its discretion because choice of the sanction chosen was based on 
erroneous conclusions of law or was not supported by the 
evidence. 
The argument of A.J. Dean set forth above establishes that 
the actions of the lower court incorporated mistaken conclusions 
of law, and were premised on fundamental misunderstanding of the 
facts relevant to the discovery process. Building on that 
framework, there are other good reasons to reverse the trial 
court's entry of default and default judgment. 
Through counsel, A.J. Dean has participated vigorously in 
proceedings before the lower court. Unlike other cases in which 
the default sanction has been imposed, this is not a case where 
the defaulting party has ignored the court or the opposing party, 
or repeatedly sought delay. 
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Even if the Roberts1 claims are accepted at face value, the 
"harm" they suffered was a thirteen day delay in receiving 
responses to two interrogatories. The "tardy" answers were never 
challenged by motion, and a review of those answers in the record 
shows that full and complete answers were provided. The thirteen 
day delay needs to be contrasted with the one year postponement 
while the Roberts were required to find new counsel because A.J. 
Dean had learned independently that Hanson, Epperson & Smith, by 
allowing Mr. Rencher to represent his sister in law Brenda 
Roberts at the same time another member of the firm was 
representing A.J. Dean, had overlooked its ethical obligations.12 
This is not a case where the Defendant sought delay because 
he had no defenses. A.J. Dean has meritorious defenses to the 
claims of the Roberts, and is ready, willing and anxious to test 
those defenses at trial. At trial, if such is allowed, A.J. Dean 
fully intends to prove that the Roberts1 seventeen causes of 
action, all arising from the delivery of cement, are without 
merit, and that under no circumstances could they be entitled to 
compensatory damages from A.J. Dean in the amount of $28,978.01. 
A.J. Dean respectfully requests that the default and default 
judgment entered by the lower court be reversed and set aside, 
and that this action be remanded to the lower court for trial on 
the merits. 
12
 Brenda Scot is the sister in law of Mr. Rencher. Mr. 
Rencher took the case in part for "family" reasons. Transcript of 
Hearing, Aug.13, 1996, R2386, p. 152. 
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DATED this day of January, 1998. 
Green & BERRY 
RaiTffond Scott Berry 
Attorney for A.J. 
Cement Company, I 
Ready Mix 
Appellant 
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I hereby certify that on the 5th day of January, 1998, I 
caused two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to be 
served by first class mail upon the following: 
REID W. LAMBERT 
WOODBURY & KESLER 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1600 
Randy B. Birch 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
5296 South Commerce Dr. #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Raymond Sco t t 
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ADDENDUM 
The following addendum is submitted pursuant to the pro-
visions of Rule 24(a)(11). 
Exhibit A: Roberts First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production to A.J. Dean R396-404 
Exhibit B: Transcript of Hearing held March 21, 1994, R2379, p, 
1-31 
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Jaryl L. Rencher #4903 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOT and BRENDA ROBERTS, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY; A.J. DEAN CEMENT 
COMPANY or in the alternative 
A.J. DEAN & SONS, INC.; MILTON 
MUIR; KATHERYNE MUIR, aka GALE 
MUIR; and JOHN R. MOYLE, aka 
MOYLE LANDSCAPING COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
MILTON MUIR dba MILTON MUIR 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
SHEILA ROBERTS, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Third-Party 
Crossclaimant. 
In accordance with the provisions of Rule 33, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Scot, Brenda and Sheila Roberts submit herewith 
the following interrogatories to be answered by all defendants, 
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS OF SCOT, BRENDA 
AND SHEILA ROBERTS 
Civil No. 930901740CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
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HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOT and BRENDA ROBERTS, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY; A.J. DEAN CEMENT 
COMPANY or ift t4ie alternative 
A.J. DEAN & SONS, INC.; MILTON 
MUIR; KATHERYNE MUIR, aka GALE J 
MUIR; and JOHN R. MOYLE, aka 
MOYLE LANDSCAPING COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
MILTON MUIR dba MILTON MUIR 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
V • 
SHEILA ROBERTS, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Third-Party 
Crossclaimant-
FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
| AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS OF SCOT, BRENDA 
AND SHEILA ROBERTS 
i Civil No. 930901740CV 
1 Judge Anne M. Stirba 
In accordance with the provisions of Rule 33, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Scot, Brenda and Sheila Roberts submit herewith 
the following interrogatories to be answered by all defendants, 
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under oath and within thirty (30) days of the date of service 
hereof. These interrogatories shall be deemed continuing so as to 
require further and supplemental answers should defendants receive 
additional pertinent information between the time the answers are 
served and the time of trial. Each interrogatory must be answered 
by each defendant separately. 
INTERROGATORIES 
1. State your full name. 
2. State any and all other names which you have ever used or 
by which you have been known. 
3. State each and every address which you have had in the 
last five years, including your present addressr and the dates of 
your residence at each. 
4. State the date and place of your birth. 
5. Which of the following is your present marital status: 
single, married, separated, widowed or divorced? 
6. If you have ever been married, state: 
a) The name and last known address of your spouse and 
every former spouse. 
b) The date and place of each such marriage. 
c) As to previous marriages, please give the date, place 
and manner of each termination. 
d) State the name, age and address of each of your 
children. 
7. State your social security number. 
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8. Have you every been a party to a civil lawsuit? 
9. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory was 
affirmative, state: 
a) Were you plaintiff or defendant. 
b) What was the nature of plaintiff's claim. 
c) When, where and in what Court was the action 
commenced. 
d) State the names of all parties other than yourself. 
10. Have you retained an expert or experts to render an 
opinion concerning the claims at issue? 
11. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory was 
affirmative, state: 
a) The name, address, education and occupation and 
telephone number of the person so retained. 
b) The date on which said expert was retained. 
c) The name and address of the person now having custody 
of each written report made concerning the expert opinion. 
12. Please state the name of each and every person who is 
skilled in a particular field or science, whom you may call as a 
witness during the trial of this action and who has expressed an 
opinion upon any issue in this action. 
13. Describe in detail the acts, omissions and conduct of any 
of the Roberts upon which you base your allegation that this 
defendant was negligent in rendering or failing to render medical 
care. 
3 
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14. Describe in detail all injuries and symptoms, whether 
physical, mental or emotional, experienced by any of you since 1979 
to the present. 
15. As to each medical practitioner who has examined or 
treated you for any of the injuries or symptoms described in 
Interrogatory No. 14 above, state: 
a) The name, address and specialty of each medical 
practitioner. 
b) The date of each examination or treatment. 
c) The physical, mental or emotional condition for which 
each examination or treatment was performed. 
16. If you have been hospitalized since 1979, state: 
a) The name and address of each hospital where you were 
confined. 
b) The dates of each hospitalization. 
c) The conditions treated during each hospitalization. 
d) The nature of the treatment rendered during each 
hospitalization. 
17. Have any diagnostic studies, tests or procedures been 
performed since 1979? 
18. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is 
affirmative, state: 
a) The nature thereof. 
b) The name, address and occupation of the person 
performing the same. 
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c) The name and address of each place where the 
diagnostic studies, tests or procedures have been performed. 
d) The name and present or last known address of each 
person now in possession or control of any records prepared in 
connection with each study, test or procedure. 
19. If you are still under the care of a medical 
practitioner, state: 
a) The name and address of each such practitioner. 
b) The nature of each condition for which care is being 
rendered. 
c) Which of the conditions is related to the medical 
treatment at issue. 
20. Set forth the names and addresses of all doctors and 
other persons practicing the healing arts and sciences, and the 
names and addresses of all hospitals or institutions by which you 
have been examined or treated or in which you have been confined 
during the fifteen (15) years prior to the date of filing your 
complaint. 
21. As to each job or position of employment, including self-
employment, held by plaintiff on the date of and since the medical 
care at issue, state: 
a) The name and address of the employer. 
b) The date of commencement of and date of termination 
of employment. 
c) The place of employment. 
5 
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d) The nature of employment and duties performed. 
e) The name and address of the immediate supervisor of 
the plaintiff. 
f) The rate of pay or compensation received. 
g) The reasons for termination. 
22. List each job or position of employment held by plaintiff 
for the five years before the medical care at issue, stating as to 
each the following: 
a) The name and address of employer. 
b) The date of commencement of and date of termination 
of employment. 
c) Place of employment. 
d) Nature of employment and duties performed. 
e) Name and address of immediate supervisor. 
f) Rate of pay or compensation received. 
g) The reason for termination. 
23. State your annual gross income from gainful employment 
for each of the five years prior to the date of the treatment at 
issue, and for the year in which the treatment occurred. 
24. Has plaintiff ever received disability or workmen's 
compensation payments? 
25. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is 
affirmative, state: 
a) The amount and from whom received. 
b) When payments were received. 
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c) The reason for receipt of those payments. 
d) For what, if any, injuries or disabilities has 
plaintiff received payments? 
26. Identify each and every individual or entity that 
performed any work on the property in question in this complaint 
and for each identify the date of work, the amounts billed, 
payments made for the work, work performed and documents relating 
to the same. 
27. Identify each and every individual either personally or 
professionally with whom any of the defendants have spoken to or 
with regarding the matters set forth in the complaint or the 
plaintiffs or Sheila or Dan Roberts, and for each identify: 
a) The date of all such communications; 
b) Who was present during the communications; 
c) Where the communications took place; 
d) The substance of each communication; 
e) Any documents referencing such communication or 
other records including tape recordings, etc. 
28. To the extent you assert any privilege over providing 
information regarding the prior interrogatory, identify the scope 
and nature of the privilege and the conversation/to the extent that 
the Court may determine whether or not a privilege exists and will 
be honored. 
7 
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Produce: 
1. A curriculum vitae of each and every person who is skilled 
in a particular field or science, whom you may call as a witness 
during the trial of this action, and who has expressed an opinion 
upon any issue in this action. 
2. Each and every record, written memoranda, copies of 
Federal or State Income Tax Returns, or other document which 
purports to show all or any portion of the income received by you 
for the five years immediately preceding the incident to the 
present time. 
3. Each and every record, written memoranda, report or other 
document which shows all or any portion of payment received from 
disability or workmen's compensation. 
4. Every document referred to in plaintiff's first set of 
interrogatories. 
DATED this f(p day of ^<A^AjP 1993. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Jaryl L. Rencher 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed, postage prepaid, this ffiTffi—day of 
xA^fTl993, to: 
Attorneys for Defendants Milton and Gale Muir 
and Third-Party Plaintiff Milton Muir 
Paul H. Van Dyke 
261 East 300 South, Suite 175 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Defendant A.J. Dean & Sons 
Randall L. Marshall 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379 
ROBKRTS\Interroga.RPD\93-250P 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
SCOT and BRENDA ROBERTS, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MILTON MUIR CONSTRUCTION CO.; 
A.J. DEAN CEMENT COMPANY or in 
the alternative A.J. DEAN & 
SONS, INC.; MILTON MUIR; GALE 
MUIR; and JOHN R. MOYLE, aka 
MOYLE LANDSCAPING COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
MILTON MUIR, dba MILTON MUIR 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
Case No. 930901740 CV 
Transcript of: 
PROCEEDINGS on 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS 
and DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
V. 
SHEILA ROBERTS, 
Third-Party Defendant: 
and Third-Party 
Crossclaimant. : 
* * * 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Monday, March 21, 1994 
REPORTER: SUZANNE WARNICK, RDR, CSR 
Official Court Reporter 
240 East 400 South, #304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: 801-535-5470 
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For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendant 
A.J. Dean: 
For the Defendant 
Milton Muir, et al, 
JARYL L. RENCHER 
Attorney at Law 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
RANDALL LEE MARSHALL 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State St., Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RANDY B. BIRCH 
Attorney at Law 
Bertch & Birch 
5296 S. Commerce Dr., Suite 100 
Murray, Utah 84107 
* * * 
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1 MONDAY, MARCH 2 1 , 1 9 9 4 ; 1 :35 P.M. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 
4 THE COURT; Let's go on the record in the matter of 
5 Roberts versus Milton Muir Construction, Case No. 930901740. 
6 Counsel, would you state your appearances. 
7 MR. RENCHER: Jaryl Rencher on behalf of the 
8 plaintiffs and the third-party defendant and crossclaimant. 
9 MR. MARSHALL: Randall Lee Marshall appearing for 
10 defendant A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc. 
11 (Mr. Randy Birch representing the Muir defendants 
12 was not present at this time but came in very shortly). 
13 THE COURT: Are your clients here today, 
14 Mr. Marshall? 
15 MR. MARSHALL: Mr. Bagley is here present. 
16 THE COURT: All right, very well. This is the time 
17 set for a hearing on the Motion to Compel, Roberts' Motion to 
18 Compel and for Sanctions. There is a Motion of A.J. Dean's 
19 for a Protective Order. There also was filed, and it was 
20 noticed up today evidently but then withdrawn, Roberts versus 
21 the Muir defendants — Muirs' Motion to Strike and Motion to 
22 Compel. And all that's been resolved. 
23 You may proceed. 
24 MR. RENCHER: Thank you, your Honor. There are 
25 several matters before the Court. And just so that we have a 
3 
1 clear record, I had filed initially a Motion to Compel and 
2 for Sanctions on answers to discovery against the defendant 
3 A.J. Dean. 
4 THE COURT: In January of 1994? 
5 MR. RENCHER: Correct. And those were in part 
6 related to discovery that was due, if my memory serves me 
7 collectly, in September of the year before. So that 
8 discovery was some four months overdue. I then filed a 
9 Motion to Compel and for Default Judgment against the Muir 
10 defendants after their new attorney filed a Motion to Strike 
11 that. 
12 And then I withdrew a portion of it and the Court 
13 entered its minute entry. So I am assuming that the Court 
14 has then ruled that the Muirs are compelled to answer that 
15 based upon the discovery that your Honor — 
16 MR. BIRCH: Randy Birch. And I would concur with 
17 Mr. Rencher's statement. We'll have those answers within 15 
18 days. And again, I brought drafts here to finalize with my 
19 client here today. My understanding is I didn't have a 
20 motion pending today. 
21 THE COURT: Right, because you withdrew your 
22 motion. 
23 MR. BIRCH: Correct. 
24 THE COURT: When you entered your appearance you 
25 were under the impression that the Motion to Compel that was 
1 filed in January of 1994 was to your clients also, and that 
2 was not the case. You were simply mistaken and therefore you 
3 withdrew. 
4 MR. BIRCH: I withdrew. So it's my understanding I 
5 don't have a motion here today. 
6 THE COURT: That's my understanding as well. 
7 MR. RENCHER: I appreciate that, your Honor. I 
8 wanted to get that on the record inasmuch as there are 
9 outstanding Requests for Admissions deemed admitted by 
10 operation of law. And I want to confirm the Court's minute 
11 entry which had nothing to do with — the Court's minute 
12 entry was not authorizing the defendants Muirs yet another 15 
13 days to object to those admissions or deny them based upon 
14 the fact that that was not before the Court when the Court 
15 entered its minute entry. 
16 MR. BIRCH: Clearly my late appearance, not today 
17 but in this case generally, that would indeed be my position. 
18 Indeed, this is a hodgepodge set of discovery. I have 
19 Interrogatory One, Interrogatory Two, Interrogatory Three, 
20 and in the middle of that I have a Request for Admission No. 
21 One. 
22 Lay persons, I'm sure, would not understand the 
23 impact and particularly not when they are mixed in with 
24 interrogatories like that. So I would request that and hope 
25 that I would have that time to respond. 
5 
1 THE COURT: Frankly, Mr. Rencher, the intent of my 
2 ruling was to give them additional time in which to respond. 
3 And I think that is extended to your Request for Admissions. 
4 So contrary to what you are saying, I am glad that you 
5 brought it up, the intent of my ruling was to give them 
6 additional time to respond to all discovery that was 
7 requested. 
8 MR. RENCHER: I would then ask, your Honor, 
9 inasmuch as before the Court ruled I drafted a Motion for 
10 Summary Judgment based upon the requests deemed admitted as a 
11 matter of law, that the Court grant me my fees and copying 
12 costs in having to file that motion that now is essentially 
13 being set aside based upon evidently an oral motion to 
14 withdraw admissions, as the rule requires, before the Court 
15 can set those aside once they are deemed admitted. 
16 THE COURT: My ruling was to award you attorney's 
17 fees that were incurred reasonably and necessarily in 
18 connection with the Motion for Default Judgment and/or in the 
19 Alternative to Compel, and that is the limit on it. It does 
20 not extend to the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
21 MR. RENCHER: So just so I sun clear, the Court is 
22 denying that request. 
23 THE COURT: That's right. 
24 MR. RENCHER: Then the only matter — a couple 
25 three matters before your Honor today would be the Motion to 
THE COURT: That's correct. And A.J. Dean's Motion 
3 for Protective Order. 
4 MR. RENCHER: Then we also have a matter dealing 
5 with a Small Claims Court suit against me directly that the 
6 Court authorized issuance of a subpoena. 
7 THE COURT: That's correct. 
8 MR. RENCHER: The record should reflect that at all 
9 times to my knowledge when the outstanding discovery was due 
10 from A.J. Dean they were represented by counsel as to that. 
11 This was not a situation such as Mr. Birch has represented 
12 with his clients. 
13 The Court's aware that I served the first set of 
14 discovery on August 18th, which would have been due some time 
15 in the mid to latter part of September. And that as of the 
16 filing of this motion with supportive memorandum I had never 
17 received any responses some five months later. 
18 The Court's no doubt aware that after I submitted 
19 this I did get some partial responses to discovery which, 
20 under the Utah Supreme Court's decision of W.W. Gardner v. 
21 Park West Village, are inadequate after the fact. And that 
22 certainly, if nothing else, the sanctions contemplated by 
23 Rule 37 are justified even if the Court is going to allow 
24 those late answers. 
The second set of discovery was served on A.J. 25 
n E&&8PJanuary 3rd, 1994, which were timely objected to. And 
m C*m not here to propose that those were late, only that the 
3^ objection was inadequate in that the Motion for Protective 
4 Order was likewise inadequate. 
5 I have attempted a formal resolution of this 
6 matter with A.J. Dean's counsel. The Court has referred to 
7 the correspondence which is attached to my motion. I don't 
8 file motions to compel unless I can support them with letters 
9 that have gone unanswered. 
10 The responses that I have had back I can lump in 
11 two categories: One, that my typographical — for lack of a 
12 better term — in the first set somehow justified no inquiry 
13 from defendants until after I filed the Motion to Compel. 
14 And secondly, that because I have got A.J. Dean referenced in 
15 two different ways on the pleadings, this somehow shows my 
16 clients' desire to harass A.J. Dean. And I'll refute both of 
17 those in turn. 
18 At the same time that I was preparing these, I was 
19 working on a medical malpractice case and some of the 
20 interrogatories inappropriately or incorrectly reflect on 
21 A.J. Dean's interrogatories, that they were to answer certain 
22 information concerning alleged medical injuries. 
23 I received a call from Mr. Bagley who is in the 
24 courtroom today, who has represented himself at least in 
25 writing to be the general manager of A.J. Dean. He indicated 
PS me that A.J# Dean was no longer represented by counsel, 
Knd he inquired as to the questions concerning this medical 
terminology. 
«?• I apologized, corrected that, and asked him to 
5 either strike those or refer to them as "the incident in 
6 question," which he was aware of in the underlying Complaint. 
7 I then received a phone conversation from 
8 Mr. Marshall, and I have confirmed that in a November 22nd 
9 letter that's attached to my Motion, where I learned that 
10 A.J. Dean, contrary to Mr. Bagley's representations, was 
11 still represented. And I confirmed with Mr. Marshall what I 
12 had said to Mr. Bagley and then reiterated this apology for 
13 the mixup in the medical terminology. And I thought that was 
14 sufficient and would handle that. 
15 When I never got the responses, I filed this 
16 Motion and then I got objections. I have set those out to 
17 the Court. I think that they are inadequate and untimely to 
18 avoid my request for sanctions. As to the first set, there 
19 are some allegations that are not supported by any cite to 
20 the record, namely: "This action is fraught with a history 
21 of plaintiff raising frivolous and meritless claims." 
22
 That goes to my second point, have I sued the 
23 right A.J. Dean? There have been — our discussions have 
24 been that A.J. Dean Cement Company is not the correct name, 
25 even though it's listed in the phone book. And I have 
IHRffiKgworn 0f record that reflects that this is not the • U H L E entity. I don't want to belabor the point, your Honor, •SBfept that I think that I have untimely and inadequate Kbswers to my First Set of Interrogatories. Mr. Marshall has represented that, how can a 
HJ corporation answer questions posed to an individual? My 
Ml response to that is that a corporation is deemed an 
9 individual for purposes of suit. And if they were 
10 inapplicable or could not be answered, that would have been a 
11 satisfactory response. 
12 If the Court doesn't have any particular questions 
13 as to the first set, let me then just move to the thrust of 
14 the remainder of my Motion and that is the Second Set of 
15 Interrogatories. 
16 In the Second Set of Interrogatories I requested 
17 that the defendants answer information concerning financial 
18 worth and assets. I did so for two reasons. I will proffer 
19 to the Court that in the Complaint that I have filed, I 
20 allege on behalf of the Roberts family that there was a 
21 financial incentive behind the fact that defendants, one or 
22 more of them, proceeded to do construction on my clients' 
23 property without permission through trespass and did so in a 
24 negligent manner. And we'll propose witnesses at trial on 
25 that matter. 
j So I wanted to find out whether indeed there was 
2 support for these allegations that I have received from 
3 witnesses, namely: That at least one of defendants started 
4 this job which he had bid but never had his bid accepted, and 
5 this was pouring a concrete driveway, because it was tax time 
6 and he needed to pay his tax bills• 
7 The second reason I requested information of 
8 financial worth is because I have alleged that there have 
9 been some malicious, willful and intentional conduct that 
10 justifies the awarding of punitive damages. I am very aware 
11 that under Title 78 punitive damage information may not be 
12 admissible. That statute says nothing though about 
13 discoverability. And under 26 I can discover inadmissible 
14 information or information that may later prove to be 
15 inadmissible as long as it's relevant. I believe that 
16 information of financial worth, liabilities, other suits that 
17 have been filed as might be reflected on a normal financial 
18 statement is relevant for purposes of this lawsuit because of 
19 the conduct that we have alleged. 
20 So the Court's aware, this conduct surrounds my 
21 clients' desire to have the driveway repoured, which led to 
22 them requesting several bids and a contractor deciding, 
23 rather than, as I have alleged, rather than waiting until the 
24 bid is accepted, just to do the job. And my client has come 
25 home and the concrete is gone and they have all kinds of 
11 
problems on their property over the remainder of the course 
of construction —damage to the house, to the yard, to 
utilities. 
And then there is the harassment, notice to 
5 creditors in the filing of, as we have alleged, wrongful 
6 property liens against the real property that has cost them 
7 thousands of dollars over the life of a refinance loan they 
8 had available but could not refinance because the lien was 
9 there in place. I have allegations for harassment, for 
10 slander because of their credit history, for slander of 
11 title. And I think those merit at least some discovery as to 
12 the financial worth of the defendants. 
13 Unless the Court has any questions, that is the 
14 basis of the Motion to Compel from A.J. Dean and two sets of 
15 discovery that are outstanding. 
16 I will reference to the Court that my Motion for 
17 Summary Judgment was as to all defendants. And I think it's 
18 important to note that, while the Court this morning has 
19 allowed the Muirs to answer those Requests for Admissions 
20 that are now overdue and deemed admitted, the Request for 
21 Admissions I am going to be suggesting to the Court when the 
22 briefing is done were not properly answered by A.J. Dean. 
23 I'll leave that — I don't believe Mr. Marshall has had an 
24 opportunity to do that. 
25 THE COURT: But your summary judgment is not 
|ip properly before the Court today• 
l2 MR. RENCHER: But what I am stating is that I have 
3 had a problem getting discovery in this case. 
4 THE COURT: That's clear. 
5 MR. RENCHER: I admit because there were some 
6 medical references that I thought I had cleared up and 
7 confirmed in writing that we would not have these problems, 
8 but they have remained. I'll submit it on that. 
9 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
10 Mr. Marshall. 
11 MR. MARSHALL: Your Honor, this case has been 
12 frustrating at best for a lot of reasons. Regarding the 
13 first set of discovery, the answers were delivered late. I'm 
14 not going to deny that; they were not produced timely. 
15 However, they have been produced. He says that they are 
16 partially answered. And yet, I don't know specifically what 
17 it is that he wants from us that he hasn't received. 
18 But let me indicate, your Honor, that when this 
19 suit started, A.J. Dean Cement Company was named as a 
20 defendant. As a courtesy, rather than filing any kind of 
21 motions or whatever, I simply alleged in the Answer that the 
22 proper entity was A.J. Dean & Sons, Inc., and that we would 
23 answer on that basis. And rather than having to do a motion 
24 to dismiss or go through all of the folderol, we would just 
25 answer and get on with it. 
13 
I thought this was going to be a pretty 
w* straightforward case. I thought that would be the way to 
3 handle it. I don't like to do a lot of frivolous, foolish 
4 things. I like to get to the meat and get it done. Then the 
5 Complaint is amended to name A.J. Dean Cement Company and 
6 A.J. Dean & Sons as parties, which shows to me a lack of 
7 inquiry as to who we are dealing with on plaintiffs' part. 
8 Then I receive a set of interrogatories. And in 
9 my opinion, 12 out of the 28 questions requested had no 
10 bearing on this lawsuit whatsoever. That's my opinion, but 
11 let me give you some examples, your Honor. Remember, I sun 
12 representing a corporation. 
13 First of all, Question No. 4, "State the date and 
14 place of your birth." 
15 No. 5, "What's your present marital status?" 
16 No. 6 is followup on that. No. 7, Social Security number. 
17 No. 11, "State in detail the acts, omissions and 
18 conduct of any of the Roberts upon which you base your 
19 allegation that this defendant was negligent." 
20 This is the plaintiffs' interrogatories. 
21 14, "Describe all injuries and symptoms physical 
22 and mental, et cetera." 
23 No. 15, As to each medical practitioner that has 
24 examined or treated you, if you have been hospitalized, if 
25 you have any diagnostic studies. And on and on it goes. 
14 
Medical records. 
No. 21, as to each job or position of employment, 
including self-employment held by plaintiff on the date of 
:4 and since the medical care issue. And on and on it goes, 
5 your Honor. Frankly, I wasn't sure what to do. 
g He said answer what we could, so we did. We 
7 answered what I thought were the relevant ones. We compiled 
8 a list, a long list — it says, "Have you ever been involved 
9 in a lawsuit?" They are involved in lawsuits all the time 
10 because they file a lot of liens, they have trouble with 
11 collections sometimes. We filed an exhaustive list of 
12 lawsuits they have been involved in as part of our answer. 
13 We did what I thought was a reasonable effort to try to 
14 answer these interrogatories. 
15 Then the Second Set of Interrogatories comes out 
16 requesting this financial search. Now, he says it has a 
17 bearing on the lawsuit because there was a bid. The bid has 
18 nothing to do with my people. That's Mr. Muir. Mr. Muir is 
19 the general contractor in this. If there is a financial 
20 incentive for Mr. Muir to go ahead and do the project even 
21 though there was no contract, that's Mr. Muir. 
22 My client was requested by Mr. Muir to bring a 
23 load of cement and dump it, and they did. Now, I don't know 
24 how there can be any financial incentive shown, for my client 
25 to simply deliver a load of cement at a request of a 
i third-party, I don't know what bearing that has in this 
2 lawsuit. 
3 As far as punitive damages, I am at a loss, 
4 frankly, your Honor. There are these allegations of 
5 harassment or liable or slander or something, and yet I am at 
6 a loss to understand that. And to put my clients through an 
7 exhaustive asset search over the past few years of a 
8 corporation simply because he thinks somehow maybe it will 
9 have some bearing on this lawsuit, to me, is onerous and just 
10 out of line. 
11 The rule of thumb is that it should be reasonably 
12 calculated to the discovery of some admissible evidence. 
13 Okay. So he gets this asset search and he sifts through it 
14 all. What out of any of that is going to become admissible 
15 evidence or lead him anywhere to any other kind of admissible 
16 evidence? I don't see it, your Honor, very frankly. And we 
17 objected to that timely. We filed the appropriate motions 
18 and we are here today arguing that. 
19 As far as the other discovery, frankly I 
20 apologize, it was late. And I don't want to bore the Court 
21 with all the reasons for that. Part of the frustration 
22 though, your Honor, has been this absurd stack of papers in 
23 my opinion. 
24 And frankly I'd like to bring this up, if this 
25 isn't the appropriate time, after this motion is heard. I 
16 
m* think the best thing to do with this whole lawsuit is to use 
HP this time as a scheduling conference, not to ignore what we 
h are doing today, but to get this thing on the fast track, to 
4 finish up the discovery in 30 days, get a trial date and get 
5 it done. We are going round and round in circles, all these 
6 motions and all this discovery. The motions are based on 
7 discovery not on any merits of the case. I think the 
8 quickest, surest way to get it done is just to try it and be 
9 done with it. Thank you. 
10 MR. RENCHER: Just a couple of matters, your Honor. 
11 What I am requesting this morning, or this 
12 afternoon, is that three, I believe it's three, four answers 
13 to discovery in my first set be answered. 
14 They have waived — 
15 THE COURT: Which ones? 
16 MR. RENCHER: Interrogatory No. 23, which asks for 
17 annual gross income. They have waived their objection to 
18 Interrogatory 26 when I have asked them to identify each and 
19 every individual that performed the work. They won't even 
20 tell me who went out there on the cement mixer on that day 
21 and performed the work so that I can inquire whether I should 
22 depose that person to find out what was said. 
23 THE COURT: So you are not interested in Answers to 
24 Interrogatories 4, 5, 6, 11, 14, 15, 21? 
25
 MR. RENCHER: Based on what Mr. Marshall has said, 
17 
fend based upon the fact that I received some answers after I 
I requested that the Court compel those, I think that it's 
H justified to request that he answer Interrogatory 23, 
H interrogatory 26 and Request for Production of Documents 2 
g; and 4. 2 requested the tax information. If they were so 
5 concerned about providing this information of financial 
7 worth, Mr. Marshall should have objected to Request No. 2. 
8 THE COURT: As to your Second Set of 
9 Interrogatories? 
10 MR. RENCHER: I think they ought to answer the 
11 second set because I do believe it's reasonably calculated — 
12 I don't have even the employees of the defendant identified 
13 in order to determine which person said or offered the 
14 explanation that financial worth or financial incentive was a 
15 basis for conducting the work in question. I believe it was 
16 Mr. Muir. But I believe there may be some financial worth 
17 information that will be admissible, and that the Court can 
18 certainly make that determination at the appropriate juncture 
19 when I move to have evidence of punitive damages put before 
20 the jury. To state that it isn't now and to wait until we 
21 are in the middle of trial to disclose that information is 
22 going to be, I think, too little too late. 
23 And I'll submit it on that. I have the other 
24 matter for the Court, and an affidavit of costs as to the 
25 Muir motion if the Court wants that filed today. 
18 
* THE COURT: You are certainly entitled to present 
2 that to the Court consistent with the Court's previous 
3 ruling. 
4 With regard to the Motion to Compel and for 
5 Sanctions, the actual two motions filed by Roberts and the 
6 Motion for Protective Order, the Court rules as follows: I 
7 have considered the arguments of counsel, the pleadings on 
8 file, including the information requested and the reasons why 
9 A.J. Dean feels that the answers should not be compelled. 
10 Based on that review it appears to me that it is 
11 appropriate for A.J. Dean to provide in the First Set of 
12 Interrogatories an answer to those Answers to Interrogatories 
13 23, 26 and the Request for Production of Documents paragraphs 
14 2 and 4, and to answer the Second Set of Interrogatories. I 
15 am not persuaded by the objections or the reasons set forth 
16 in support of the Motion for Protective Order as to those 
17 particular paragraphs. 
18 I also think that under the circumstances 
19 attorney's fees are appropriate. And as to that issue, 
20 Mr. Rencher is to submit to the Court an affidavit of the 
21 reasonable and necessarily incurred attorney's fees and costs 
22 in connection with the Motion to Compel and in response to 
23 the Motion for Protective Order. 
24 Also A.J. Dean will have 15 days from today's 
25 date, which is April 5th if I have counted correctly, to file 
19 
a those answers. If those answers are not timely filed, the 
2 Court would entertain a Motion to Strike the pleadings of 
3 A.J. Dean and enter default against A.J. Dean. 
4 I also think Mr. Marshall's suggestion is a good 
5 one. Counsel, how much time do you need to complete 
6 discovery in this case now? 
7 MR. RENCHER: Months ago, your Honor, I filed a 
8 request for a scheduling conference — and I don't have my 
9 calendar with me today — but I had supposed that we would be 
10 able to get this discovery. My clients want a couple of 
11 three depositions. Then we are ready to go. 
12 THE COURT: How much time do you need? 
13 MR. RENCHER: I think that if the discovery is 
14 provided in 15 days, an additional 30 days to get those 
15 depositions, 60 days at the outside to complete discovery. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Birch, you are new into this case. 
17 MR. BIRCH: I am. It's my understanding that the 
18 Muirs have conducted no discovery, although this is the third 
19 set of answers that they will now have answered. I rely on 
20 counsel. 
21 Is that accurate to the best of your knowledge? 
22 MR. RENCHER: Muirs' prior counsel served upon me a 
23 set of interrogatories and requests. I produced answers, 
24 photographs, expert witness — proposed expert witness 
25 reports. 
20 
• MR. BIRCH: If we have got the one set, then I 
g suspect the 60 days will be adequate, your Honor. 
^ THE COURT: Mr. Marshall? 
4 MR. MARSHALL: That's adequate for us. 
5 THE COURT: Then discovery cutoff in this case will 
6 be May 23rd. If you intend to file any dispositive motions, 
7 do so on or before May 30th — actually that would be 
8 Memorial Day weekend — so May 31st is the date by which to 
9 file dispositive motions. If no dispositive motion is filed, 
10 then file a Certification of Readiness for Trial on or before 
11 June 6th. If you file a dispositive motion, if any party 
12 does, then don't file a certification but just proceed in 
13 accordance with Rule 4-501. 
14 Do you need any designation cutoff for experts in 
15 this case? 
16 MR. RENCHER: I think it would help, your Honor, 
17 because I still don't know if they plan to call anybody. If 
18 they do I would like to depose them before that discovery 
19 cutoff. 
20 THE COURT: Can you do that by the 8th of April? 
21 MR. MARSHALL: If Mr. Rencher will provide to us in 
22 enough time before that a list of his experts so we know who 
23 we need to obtain to review. 
24 MR. RENCHER: I provided the list of the engineer 
25 and I do have a financial expert. 
21 
• THE COURT: So you have already identified that? 
„ MR. RENCHER: Yes. 
^ THE COURT: Well, you send out your designation by 
4 Friday of this week so that that's in writing. Plaintiff to 
5 designate by Friday, the 25th of March. Defendants or all 
6 other parties are to designate by April 8th. 
7 MR. MARSHALL: Could we get an extra week on that, 
8 to the 15th? Is that a problem? 
9 THE COURT: It's not a problem. If you need to 
10 depose them, as long as they were scheduled for deposition by 
11 discovery cutoff, I am not going to object. 
12 MR. MARSHALL: The discovery cutoff is May — 
13 MR. RENCHER: May 23rd. It seems the end of April 
14 shouldn't be too onerous to provide that list. It's all 
15 right with me if you wait until April 15th, that's fine. 
16 THE COURT: Sometimes it's a problem with 
17 scheduling experts, you know, that soon. But it's all right 
18 with me. If you want to April 15th, so be it. 
19 MR. RENCHER: I may need until the 1st, your Honor, 
20 to get a financial expert on these new damages. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Why don't you take to the 
22 30th. Then that gives them half that week. 
23 MR. MARSHALL: Thank you, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: All right. I would like Mr. Rencher to 
25 prepare a scheduling order as to those dates. 
22 
j As to the other issue — 
2 MR. RENCHER: If I may approach, your Honor. This 
3 is the Return Subpoena and Proof of Service that I would like 
4 filed. Attached — it's in the file, it isn't before the 
5 Court, so let me just refer to — attached to Plaintiffs' 
6 Motion for Summary Judgment was a letter I received from 
7 Mr. Bagley. I can't find it quick enough to aid the Court. 
8 If I may approach one other time. This is a 
9 letter dated February 10th I received from Mr. Bagley, and a 
10 Small Claims Court Affidavit that I received that was served 
11 upon me I believe it was Thursday the 17th. 
12 I received this letter dated February 10th from 
13 Mr. Bagley claiming that I owed him some $1700 because of the 
14 discovery that he evidently had to research, which the Court 
15 through its order has indicated was justified today. This 
16 was discovery that I didn't ask him to do. He is the general 
17 manager of the defendant A.J. Dean, and assumingly 
18 Mr. Marshall either asked him to do itf or if he has a 
19 supervisor he was instructed to do so by his supervisor of 
20 the named defendant. I need not belabor the point. 
21 The plaintiff is authorized under rules of 
22 discovery to compel defendants to do discovery. If they 
23 thought it was going to take $1700, they could have filed a 
24 Rule 26 motion timely and asked for some type of 
25 compensation. I haven't even received those records that are 
23 
H f referred to in that February 10th letter from Mr; magleyJBI 
g| certainly think it's inappropriate to charge a plaintiffri^ii 
gi because you are upset over a lawsuit with the costs of having 
% to do that discovery and perform those discovery 
5 responsibilities. 
g When I got that letter I informed Mr. Marshall and 
7 told him I received it, in correspondence, and had asked him 
8 to ask Mr. Bagley to not contact me directly as I had 
9 subsequent to that February 10th letter I had received a call 
10 from Mr. Bagley because the first time he told me he wasn't 
11 represented and this time I wanted to be extra careful. In 
12 response to that letter then I assume Mr. Bagley was notified 
13 that I would not be paying that bill, and I got the Small 
14 Claims Court Affidavit. 
15 My motion today, I believe under this Court's 
16 jurisdiction under Title 78, this Court can issue whatever 
17 writs are appropriate. We spoke on the phone last week and 
18 Mr. Marshall was also there. I suggested an order dismissing 
19 the Small Claims Court Affidavit with prejudice. The Court 
20 thought that perhaps we can certainly move at this time to 
21 amend the Complaint and allege abusive process and negligent 
22 supervision. 
23 THE COURT: I don't believe I suggested that. 
24 MR. RENCHER: I apologize, I misspoke. I suggested 
25 it to the Court. The Court said that it would certainly hear 
24 
n the matter later. I would like an opportunity, if this is 
& not resolved today, to move the Court and make this an oral 
3 motion — I don't think it needs to be briefed — to amend my 
4 Complaint to allege abuse of process and certainly at least 
5 negligence against defendant A.J. Dean for failing to 
6 supervise his general manager. 
7 THE COURT: I guess I have a problem with that 
8 because you are the main defendant in the Small Claims 
9 action, you personally, Mr. Rencher. I don't think you can 
10 amend the Complaint in this case because the plaintiffs are 
11 the Roberts and you are not a party to this case. So I think 
12 that's a problem. 
13 MR. RENCHER: Well, I can see the Court's point. I 
14 am not trying to create litigation. I certainly was acting 
15 — this dispute with Mr. Bagley has to do with discovery. I 
16 was acting as plaintiffs' attorney at law in doing discovery. 
17 THE COURT: I understand. 
18 MR. RENCHER: I assumed they would have to pay 
19 this. 
20 THE COURT: There may be a better way to resolve 
21 it. Anything else, Mr. Rencher? 
22 MR. RENCHER: No. I'll submit that, your Honor, to 
23 either make an appropriate motion or at least a motion to 
24 stay this until we resolve the pending matter. I just think 
25 it's abuse of process and I would like to get it resolved 
25 
1 before we have to conduct further litigation. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you. 
3 Mr. Marshall. 
4 MR. MARSHALL: First of all, your Honor, let me 
5 make it clear that I am here in a capacity representing A.J. 
6 Dean & Sons, Inc. I am not here representing Mr. Bagley 
7 personally. Second of all, let the record be very clear and 
8 I would prefer to swear under oath — 
9 THE COURT: You are an officer of the Court. You 
10 are obliged to make correct recommendations to the Court. 
11 MR. MARSHALL: I will. I never encouraged or 
12 condoned the filing of this action. In fact, after the 
13 conversation between opposing counsel and myself and the 
14 Court last week, I did contact Mr. Bagley and encouraged him 
15 to get that dismissed or resolve if however he thought was 
16 appropriate. I have nothing to do with this. I don't want 
17 anything to do with this. 
18 THE COURT: All right. 
19 Mr. Bagley, did you file a small claims action 
20 against Mr. Rencher? 
21 MR. ROBERT BAGLEY: Yes, personally. 
22 THE COURT: All right. I want you to be sworn in. 
23 (Whereupon, the clerk of the court administered the 
24 oath to the gentleman at counsel table). 
25 THE COURT: You are Robert Bagley? 
26 
1 MR. ROBERT BAGLEY: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: You are the general manager for A.J. 
3 Dean? 
4 MR. ROBERT BAGLEY: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: And you filed a small claims action 
6 against Mr. Rencher? 
7 MR. ROBERT BAGLEY: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bagley, whatever 
9 differences you may have with counsel in litigation, counsel 
10 are entitled — in fact, they are responsible and must and do 
11 have an obligation to zealously represent the interests of 
12 their clients, and that includes doing discovery in a 
13 lawsuit. Do you understand that, Mr. Bagley? 
14 MR. ROBERT BAGLEY: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Is it your intention to 
16 attempt to prosecute this claim in Small Claims Court? 
17 MR. ROBERT BAGLEY: I'm out the $1700 that was 
I 
18 deducted from my pay. I feel if he had even done so much as 
19 read the interrogatory that was directed towards me and about 
I 
20 my health problems, I would have avoided the 28.25 hours of 
21 research which I'm out the money. I don't think, you know — 
I 
22 You know, it has nothing to do with the A.J. Dean 
23 lawsuit. It's money that I am out because of his even so 
24 much as failure to read the documents that he directed 
25 towards me. I took them seriously. He signed the documents, 
1 and I made the effort and responded to his office in writing 
2 with my medical records as he requested. 
3 THE COURT: Well, I will tell you this: The 
4 problem that I have got, it's a procedural one here, 
5 Mr. Bagley. You are not a named party to this lawsuit. I 
6 did sign and permit the issuance of a subpoena ordering you 
7 to appear here today, and counsel have sort of briefly run by 
8 different possibilities, which counsel, as I have instructed 
9 you, are responsible for doing what Mr. Rencher has done in 
10 this case. And this is the first time I have ever seen 
11 anyone frankly have the temerity to file a lawsuit against a 
12 lawyer for alleged costs. And — 
13 But counsel, I do have a problem procedurally 
14 since Mr. Bagley is not a party to this case. 
15 I'll tell you though, Mr. Bagley, that — well, 
16 strike that. 
17 This is a different circumstance, counsel, than 
18 what I thought it was in that I thought that a party had 
19 actually filed a small claims action. The fact that 
20 Mr. Bagley is not a party does put this in a slightly 
21 different light. 
22 That does not mean that the Court cannot at some 
23 point obtain jurisdiction necessarily. But you would have to 
24 brief that and present that to the Court. I don't have 
25 jurisdiction over Mr. Bagley except to the extent that he has 
28 
1 answered or participated in the answering of interrogatories. 
2 Mr. Bagley, I will tell you though, I think you 
3 are barking up the wrong tree as far as what you have been 
4 doing. At least that's my sense of it. And were this a 
5 party, the Court clearly would have jurisdiction and the 
6 Court's jurisdiction could include contempt, Rule 11 
7 sanctions and other issues, other remedies. Because, as I 
8 say, the purpose of litigation is for parties to sort out 
9 their claims in a civil and appropriate manner, and they are 
10 entitled to do discovery. 
11 And I don't know why you, yourself, were docked 
12 pay for one thing or another. That is a matter I have no 
13 knowledge of. But I think it's a very serious matter that 
14 you filed a lawsuit against a lawyer in this particular case. 
15 Having said that, counsel, I am not going to take 
16 any other action here today. If you wish to do anything else 
17 with regard to this action, then you'll have to file the 
18 appropriate motion with the court and supporting memorandum, 
19 and then the Court will deal with that in due course if that 
20 comes to my attention. 
21 Is there anything else, counsel? 
22 MR. RENCHER: No, your Honor. If Mr. Bagley 
23 intends to pursue it, we better strike the dates that we 
24 proposed. Because I then must file a countersuit against 
25 Mr. Bagley and A.J. Dean personally which puts me in a 
29 
1 position of conflict, unless counsel is willing to waive it. 
2 And I will initiate my own independent action against 
3 Mr. Bagley and A.J. Dean. And I can no longer then, I feel, 
4 represent the Roberts without that potential conflict arising 
5 because I would have a personal stake. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. What I want you folks to do 
7 before you leave this courtroom this afternoon is sit down 
8 and talk about these various problems that have arisen 
9 because of this small claims action and see if you can sort 
10 it out yourself. I consider it to be a very serious matter 
11 to the extent that it adversely affects on the proper 
12 prosecution of this case or defense of this case. I have a 
13 very specific concern about that. But frankly, without 
14 jurisdiction over an individual the Court is somewhat 
15 limited. 
16 MR. RENCHER: Well, I make an oral motion for a 
17 writ. 
18 THE COURT: Well, you brief it, Mr. Rencher. You 
19 are going to have to brief it. 
20 MR. RENCHER: I understand, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Court's in recess. 
22 (This concludes these proceedings). 
23 * * * 
24 
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